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THOUGHTS ABOUT JUDGING 
Henry J. Friendly* 
THE JUDGE. By Patrick .Devlin. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 1979. Pp. xi, 201. £7.50. 
Lord Devlin's latest book is built upon seven lectures delivered to 
different audiences in England over a three-year period. Naturally, 
therefore, "The Judge" is the English judge. From the standpoint of 
an American reader, this produces excessive emphasis on Lord Dev-
lin's distaste for the judgment of the House of Lords, unanimous in 
result although not in reasoning, in Stafford v . .D.P.P. , 1 discussed be-
low. After being carried along through 200 pages of Lord Devlin's 
consistently witty and sparkling prose, 2 this reviewer ended without 
an altogether clear comprehension of his notion of what an English 
appellate judge should do in a situation when rigorous adherence to 
precedent or to the letter of a statute would produce what he deemed 
an unfortunate result. 
Lord Devlin seems to have moved at least some distance from his 
declaration of 1962 that the common law "cannot abrogate an ex-
isting principle of law and I doubt whether it is now ever likely to 
invent a completely new one."3 This may be due, in some measure, 
to the liberating influence of Lord Chancellor Gardiner's extra-judi-
cial pronouncement in 1966 that the House of Lords will no longer 
hold to the practice that it cannot overrule an earlier decision, a 
change in policy given effect in Conway v. Rimmer.4 Lord Devlin 
indicates that, even without the Lord Chancellor's pronouncement, 
he would have felt free, had he continued as a Lord of Appeal in 
Ordinary, to make changes in rules of evidence and procedure (p. 
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Presiding Judge, 
Special Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act.-Ed. 
I. [1974) A.C. 878. 
2. To take just one example, his assault upon Stafford, delivered at a lecture at All Souls 
College, Oxford, begins: 
Today is the feast of the great Saint Anthanasius, the scourge of heretics, who died this 
day sixteen hundred and five years ago after much wielding of the anathema. So it is a 
day on which a man can pluck up his courage and challenge even a unanimous decision 
of the House of Lords. 
P. 148. One wonders how many among even the distinguished fellows of All Souls had real-
ized that May 2 was the feast of St. Anthanasius! 
3. P. DEVLIN, SAMPLES OF LAWMAKING 113 (1962). 
4. [1968] A.C. 910. 
634 
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14), agreeing in that respect with the minority in Myers v . .Director of 
Public Prosecutions.5 
Lord Devlin's current views on the proper approach to a conflict 
between precedent or the letter of a statute and the judge's opinion 
as to the desirable result6 appear in his first lecture, "The Judge as 
Lawmaker," delivered in 1975 (pp. 1-17). Instead of the position of 
1962, Lord Devlin now limits his veto to "judicial creativity or dyna-
mism," to wit, 'judicial operations in advance of the consensus" (p. 
9), as distinguished from 'judicial activism." In developing this 
theme, he draws a sharp distinction between common law and stat-
ute law. 
With respect to statute law, Lord Devlin first states that the judge 
must not do anything but "interpret and apply" (p. 9). However, he 
immediately qualifies this by saying that "[w]hen the consensus 
behind the purpose of a statute is clear and strong, a judge could 
perhaps risk - later on I shall stress the risk - going beyond inter-
pretation towards development." In contrast, if the statute is contro-
versial, "a judge must be very cautious about any extension of the 
written word" (p. 10). The basis for this interesting distinction ap-
parently is an assumption that in the former case the legislature was 
willing to leave "development" to the judges because it did not care 
overly much about the precise boundaries, whereas in the latter case 
the judges should leave things exactly as the legislature said (assum-
ing - and this may be a larger assumption than Lord Devlin ac-
knowledges - that the court can decipher this) because contro-
versial legislation is likely to reflect either a compromise or a victo-
ry over a substantial minority. Lord Devlin does not say what he 
believes a judge should do when literal interpretation of even 
controversial legislation would produce a clearly perverse result. Al-
though Lord Devlin remains "unconvinced that there is anything ba-
sically wrong with the rule of construction that words in a statute 
should be given their natural and ordinary meaning" (p. 14), he lim-
its this rule both by stating that it "does not insist on a literal inter-
pretation or require the construction of a statute without regard to its 
manifest purpose" and by approving a characteristically sensible 
5. [1965] A.C. 1001. The speeches of the majority, which included Lord Reid, with respect 
to the dire portents of creating a new exception to the hearsay rule, make strange reading for 
an American appellate judge. See L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAW MAK-
ERS 28-29 (1969). 
6. When I speak of the desirable result, I am not, of course, suggesting free-wheeling law-
making or departure from controlling precedents simply to take care of peculiarly sympathetic 
cases, but rather the establishment of new principles of law thought to be better attuned to 
other developments, whether legislative or judicial. Examples in this country are the creation 
of strict products liability and the abolition of immunity for charitable institutions. 
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judgment of Lord Diplock in Regina v. National Insurance Commis-
sioner ,7 where the latter endorsed "a purposive approach to the Act 
as a whole to ascertain the social ends it was intended to achieve and 
the practical means by which it was expected to achieve them." 
This, after all, is not really different from the approach long taken by 
American judges who have expressed disdain for the plain meaning 
rule. Judge Learned Hand wrote in his early days that statutes 
should be read "not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagina-
tion of the purposes which lie behind them,"8 and later admonished 
that "statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, 
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to 
their meaning."9 Justice Holmes had stated even , earlier that "the 
general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any 
rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down." 10 
A good illustration of how Lord Devlin's approach would lead to 
a result different from that of at least some American judges is 
United States v. Hutcheson .11 The question was whether certain la-
, bor activities could be the subject of a criminal prosecution under 
the Sherman Act. In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, enacted in 1932, 
Congress had deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin 
such activities. Since that statute was highly controversial and Con-
gress had spoken only of injunctions and not of criminal prosecu-
tions, Lord Devlin would surely say that a court should go no 
further. 12 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for a Supreme Court ma-
jority of six, took a different view, stating that the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act made it unnecessary to determine "whether the conduct is legal 
within the restrictions which .Duplex Printing Press Co. v. .Deering 
· gave to the immunities of§ 20 of the Clayton Act." For then "[i]t 
,. would be strange indeed that although neither the Government nor 
[the employer] could have sought an injunction against the acts here 
challenged, the elaborate efforts to permit such conduct failed to pre-
• vent criminal liability punishable with imprisonment and heavy 
: ·.fines." 13 In addition to other considerations, Lord Devlin would 
7. [1972] A.C. 944, 1005. 
8. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 
U.S. 705 (1915). 
9. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). 
IO. United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905). 
ll. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
12. Cf. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 245-46 (1941) (Roberts, J., dissenting) 
(''The construction of the act now adopted is the more clearly inadmissible when we remember 
that the scope of proposed amendments and repeals of the antitrust laws in respect of labor 
organizations has been the subject of constant controversy and consideration in Congress."), 
13. 312 U.S. at 233-34. 
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doubtless feel that the prominent role Justice Frankfurter had played 
in securing enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act while a law pro-
fessor14 should have led him to be particularly cautious in going be-
yond what Congress had been persuaded to enact. On the whole, 
despite my admiration of Justice Frankfurter, I here come down on 
what I think would be Lord Devlin's side. 15 
While I thus understand and in some measure agree with Lord 
Devlin's views of the proper role of the judge in statutory interpreta-
tion, I cannot be certain just what he is trying to tell us with respect 
to decisions at common law. There he thinks activism is appropriate 
if "it operates within the consensus" (p. 10), but not if it goes outside 
it. The difficulty is that he does not indicate precisely what he means 
by consensus in this context. Lord Devlin suggests that his require-
ment is satisfied when a decision adopts a view that the judge can be 
confident all or almost all laymen would share and also when most 
laymen have no view one way or the other on the issue before the 
court. He gives as an example of the former situation the question 
whether a man may "recover damages from a friend who has given 
bed and breakfast to his deserting wife" (pp. 10-11 ). Even if we 
should go along with Lord Devlin in assuming a nearly universal 
consensus for a negative answer, could we be so confident of one 
with respect to, say, the abolition of interspousal immunity for torts 
or the rule prohibiting one spouse from testifying against another in 
a criminal case? 16 As Justice Story wisely observed, "It is one thing 
to believe a doctrine universally admitted, because we ourselves 
think it clear; and quite another thing to establish the fact." 17 On the 
very next page Lord Devlin seems to suggest a slightly different no-
tion, namely, that the requirement of consensus is satisfied if the tri-
bunal is confident that taking a new path revolutionary in the legal 
14. As is well known, the act stemmed largely from F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE 
LABOR INJUNCTION 210-28 (1930). 
15. See my discussion in Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, reprinted in 
BENCHMARKS 196, 220-22 (1967). 
In addition to the considerations there stated, the Court's analogy between criminal prose-
cutions and injunctions was far from perfect. See Comment, Restraint of Trade: Labor Dis-
putes and The Sherman Act, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 402 n.18 (1941). One of the chief 
objections to federal injunctions against labor activities was that a person alleged to have vio-
lated such an injunction was "tried by the same judge who issued the injunction and was not 
entitled to the benefit of a jury of his peers." A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 65 
(8th ed. 1977). 
16. As to the former, see w. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 122, at 859-64 (4th ed. 1971); 
as to the latter, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), overruling Hawkins v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
17. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 1289, at 
167 n.2 (1833). 
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world will not cause much public uproar (p. 11).18 This strikes me as 
a poor guide. Few changes in common-law rules are likely to cause 
the public to take to the barricades. Even when a change in the com-
mon law may seem at first blush to be popular, this might not be so if 
the public were informed of its consequences. For example, the pub-
lic might be less enthusiastic about absolute products liability if in-
formed that it is not a free lunch and that more damage awards to 
the relatively few victims may involve higher costs to all. More help-
ful factors to consider in deciding whether stare decisis requires ad-
herence to an old rule that a judge no longer deems just are whether 
change has been prefigured by decisions on related issues or by stat-
utory reform, the prospects for legislative action (unless, of course, 
the dimness of the prospects can fairly be attributed to opposition to 
change rather than to legislative preoccupation with other matters), 
and the extent to which the change will harm persons who have ac-
ted in reliance on the old rule (unless the court gives its decision 
solely prospective application, a technique of which Lord Devlin dis-
approves (p. 12) but which American courts are employing with in-
creasing frequency19). 
The title of the lecture "The Judge and Case Law" (pp. 177-201) 
affords some promise of further enlightenment on the freedom of 
appellate judges. The promise is largely unfulfilled, although the 
lecture contains some interesting thoughts. Lord Devlin's ire had 
been aroused by a passing remark of Lord Chief Justice Widgery in 
Regina v. Turnbu!!,20 a judgment in which the Court of Appeal laid 
down "guidelines" with respect to prosecutions resting primarily on 
eyewitness identifications. Acknowledging that the court had "tried 
to follow the recommendations set out in the Report which Lord 
Devlin's Committee made to the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department in April 1976," Lord Widgery stated that it had not 
"followed that report in using the phrase 'exceptional circumstances' 
to describe situations in which the risk of mistaken identification is 
18. He cites as examples Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932] A.C. 562, the British equivalent of 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), and the guidelines with 
respect to punitive damages laid down in Rookes v. Barnard, (1964] A.C. 1129, in which he 
participated. 
19. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 
(1975) (rejecting contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence); Williams v. De-
troit, 364 Mich. 231, Ill N.W.2d 1 (1961) (overruling doctrine of municipal immunity from 
tort liability); Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969) (overruling 
doctrine that wife has no separate cause of action for loss of consortium as a result of negligent 
injury to her husband); Schwartz v. U.S. Rubber Corp., 112 N.J. Super. 595, 272 A.2d 310 
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971), qffd., 118 N.J. Super. 128, 286 A.2d 724 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1972) (abolishing parental immunity from tort liability arising out of automobile accidents). 
20. [1977] 1 Q.B. 224. 
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reduced" by the existence of other evidence since "[i]n our judgment 
the use of such a phrase is likely to result in the buildup of case law 
as to what circumstances can properly be described as exceptional 
and what cannot" and "[c]ase law of this kind is likely to be a fetter 
on the administration of justice when so much depends upon the 
quality of the evidence in each case."21 Lord Devlin finds it "a great 
shock to read of a Lord Chief Justice of England, speaking for a 
court of appeal of five, and saying, as it seems, that the common law 
fetters the administration of justice" (p. 177). 
This would indeed be a shock, but I do not read the Lord Chief 
Justice as having said anything of the kind, although he might have 
chosen his words more carefully. The court had already laid down 
guidelines to govern the conduct of trial judges, guidelines from 
which American courts could profit. All that Lord Widgery was say-
ing was that the instances in which eyewitness identifications are rea-
sonably reliable are so varied that it would be unwise to seek to 
encapsulate them in a single and not particularly apt phrase. Since, 
in addition, the entire discussion was unnecessary to the judgment, 
considerable hypersensitivity is needed to perceive Lord Widgery's 
comment as a frontal attack on the basic premises of the common 
law. Indeed, the court's careful differentiation of the cases of 
Turnbull and Camelo, where it dismissed the appeals, and those of 
Whitby and Roberts, where it allowed them, furnishes a splendid 
basis for the development of case law, despite the rejection of the 
precise formulation proposed by Lord Devlin's Committee.22 As 
Lord Devlin shrewdly observes elsewhere, "a reported judge may 
make law whether he wants to or not. The only way in which he can 
make quite sure that one of his decisions does not get used as a pre-
cedent is to give no reasons for it" (p. 180). 
A final word should be said about Lord Devlin's attack on Staf-
ford v . .Director of Public Prosecutions.23 Although the decision 
turned in large part on the wording of the Criminal Appeal Act of 
1964 and to that extent is of limited interest to American readers, the 
same basic problem also arises where, as in the federal and most 
state systems, the power of an appellate court to reverse a conviction 
and order a new trial is less shackled by detailed statutory provisions 
than in England. Basically the question is this: When a defendant 
who has been properly convicted presents "fresh evidence" not 
21. [1977] 1 Q.B. at 231. 
22. American courts are doing exactly this with the "guidelines" supplied in Neil v. Big-
gers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). See, e.g., Chavis v. Henderson, 638 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1980). 
23. [1974] A.C. 878. 
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available at his trial, is the proper test for an appellate court whether 
the evidence would create a reasonable doubt in its own mind, as the 
House of Lords held in Stafford, or whether it might have created 
such a doubt in the minds of a reasonable jury, as Lord Devlin 
strongly asserts?24 Although most American courts would follow 
Lord Devlin's approach,25 I cannot find the Stafford decision so 
egregious as he maintains. Surely it is going too far to assert that the 
decision means that a man can now be convicted in England without 
a guilty verdict by a jury (pp. 157-58). There was such a verdict 
against Stafford, admittedly a sound and proper one on the evidence 
before the jury. The question is how judges should characterize the 
nature of their inquiry into new evidence that was not before the jury 
- whether they should ask how it would affect them or how they 
think it would have affected the jury. One must wonder how impor-
tant the difference really is. When the "fresh evidence" is palpably 
weighty, either phrasing will result in a reversal; when it is of slight 
consequence, neither will. In the residue how else is the appellate 
judge to determine what a reasonable jury might or could do except 
by asking himself what he would have done if he had been on the 
jury? Granted that "any judge who has presided over an appreciable 
number of jury trials will remember cases in which he had no rea-
sonable doubt but the jury had" (p. 161), he will also remember al-
most as many where he had a reasonable doubt but the jury had not 
and a great majority in which he and the jury agreed.26 On what 
basis is he to say that although the fresh evidence would not create a 
reasonable doubt in his mind in the particular case, it would, could, 
24. A more precise phrasing might be "of a sufficient number of reasonable jurors" to 
avoid a conviction. See United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969). 
25. A defendant seeking a new trial because of newly discovered evidence must ordinarily 
show that the evidence would probably produce an acquittal in the event of retrial. See Berry 
v. State, IO Ga. 511, 527 (1851); SA J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 33.03 (2d ed. 1980 rev.), 
q: Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (determination whether improper ad-
mission of confessions constitutes harmless error "must be based on our own reading of the 
record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact ... on the minds of an 
average jury"). In general, a defendant is not entitled to a new trial if the freshly discovered 
evidence is "merely cumulative or impeaching." Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. I, 9 
(1956). 
In certain circumstances a lesser showing of materiality is sufficient to obtain a new trial. 
Many courts apply a Jess stringent standard to new trial motions based on evidence establish-
ing that false testimony was given at trial. See Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th 
Cir. 1928); SA J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, at~ 33.03. The burden on the defendant 
is also lighter where the evidence in question was known to the prosecution during the trial 
and not disclosed to the defense, particularly if the evidence should have alerted the prosecutor 
that his case may have included perjured testimony or if the evidence was specifically re-
quested by the defense before trial. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976). 
26. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 182-90 (1966) (suggesting a differ-
ential in the range of 11% between the actual determinations of the jury and the putative 
determinations of the judge). 
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or might in the mind of a reasonable juror? The choice of the verb 
by which the inquiry is put, to which Lord Devlin gives little atten-
tion, seems more important to me than the choice of the mind sought 
to be plumbed. In sum I do not think the historic liberties of En-
glishmen have been threatened by Stafford v . .Director of Public Pros-
ecutions, whether the decision was right or wrong under the 
language of the Criminal Appeal Act. 
